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ABSTRACT 
The Advanced Test Reactor (ATR) at the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) began operation in 1967. It 
makes use of a unique serpentine fuel core design and a beryllium reflector. Reactor control is 
achieved with rotating beryllium cylinders to which have been fastened plates of hafnium. Over time, 
the beryllium develops rather high helium content because of nuclear transmutations and begins to 
swell. The beryllium must be replaced at nominally 10-year intervals. Determination of when the 
replacement is made is by visual observation using a periscope to examine the beryllium surface for 
cracking and swelling. Disposition of the irradiated beryllium was once accomplished in the INL’s 
Radioactive Waste Management Complex, but that is no longer possible. Among contributing reasons 
are high levels of specific radioactive contaminants including transuranics. The INL is considering 
disposition pathways for this irradiated beryllium, but presently is storing it in the canal adjacent to 
the reactor. Numerous issues are associated with this situation including (1) is there a need for ultra-
low uranium material? (2) Is there a need to recover tritium from irradiated beryllium either because 
this is a strategic material resource or in preparation for disposal? (3) Is there a need to remove 
activation and fission products from irradiated beryllium? (4) Will there be enough material available 
to meet requirements for research reactors (fission and fusion)? This paper discusses the present 
status of considerations on these issues. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Advanced Test Reactor (ATR) was built at 
the Idaho National Laboratory in response to needs 
for high-flux, large volume irradiation testing of 
advanced reactor fuels and materials. The reactor first 
went critical in July 1967. Since that time it has 
served as a premier test bed for investigating the 
effects of neutron irradiation on a wide variety of 
materials and the performance of a number of reactor 
fuel concepts. 
The ATR, with its unique serpentine core design 
(Figure 1) is really 5 nearly independent reactors in 
one. Each of the 4 corner lobes can be controlled 
independently, and the center region operates with 
contributions from each of the corner lobes. Each of 
the 5 regions is capable of generating 50 MWth for a 
total rated reactor power of 250 MWth. In recent 
years, most of the operation has been at the lower 
power level of 110 – 120 MWth.
There are 9 flux traps in the reactor core, one in 
each of the 4 corner lobes, one on each side, between 
each of the corner lobes, and another at the core  
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Figure 1. Cross section of the ATR core showing key 
beryllium components. 
center. These flux traps have the same outer 
dimension but are of two sizes in the test space: 127 
mm diameter in the northwest and northeast lobes  
(top outside corners in Figure 1) and 76-mm diameter 
in the other flux traps. The smaller flux traps have 
hafnium safety rods (arc sectors) taking up space 
around the outer periphery of the flux traps. Five of 
the flux traps have pressurized water loops installed 
(Figure 2) where coolant conditions representative 
several different kinds of reactors can be replicated. 
Figure 2. Operating ATR core showing pressurized 
water loops in the flux traps. 
II. BERYLLIUM COMPONENTS 
Beryllium is essential to the operation of the 
ATR. Surrounding the serpentine fuel elements 
(Figure 1) is the beryllium reflector. This structure 
enhances neutron flux in the core through neutron 
reflection and (n, 2n) reactions. Within the reflector 
are 16 outer shim control cylinders (OSCCs). 
Configured as shown in Figure 3, these are 18.2-cm 
diameter beryllium cylinders with 63-mm thick 
hafnium plates covering 120 degree arc sectors 
at the surface. The hafnium is a strong neutron 
absorber. When the OSCCs are rotated such that the 
hafnium plates are near the fuel, they absorb 
neutrons, maintaining core criticality with fresh fuel 
whose neutron production is higher than needed for 
operation. As the fuel is burned and specific neutron 
production falls off, the OSCCs are rotated away 
from the fuel, absorbing fewer neutrons and 
maintaining the core power at the desired levels. 
Figure 3. Outer shim control cylinders are comprised 
of three beryllium segments, hafnium plates for 
neutron absorption, and other pieces. 
Also in the beryllium reflector are a number of 
test positions (see Figure 1). These range in size from 
22.2-mm diameter in locations next to the fuel 
elements to 127-mm diameter at the four cardinal 
directions from core center. All of these test positions 
are 121 mm in length, running the full height of the 
core. 
The beryllium reflector is fabricated in 8 separate 
sectors (Figure 4), 4 each in left hand and right hand 
configurations. Each of these sectors is originally 
pressed as a 740-kg billet that is machined down to 
84.5 kg. The material for these pieces is Brush 
Wellman S200-F beryllium that has been hot pressed 
and sintered. There are specific limits on impurities 
for 13 different elements and the catch-all 
requirement that all other impurities must be less than 
400 appm. There is no specific requirement for 
uranium impurity, but this naturally occurring 
contaminant has had substantial consequences for the 
ATR.
The beryllium in the ATR, as in most beryllium-
reflected reactors, requires periodic replacement. To 
understand why, consider the neutron reactions for 
beryllium shown in Figure 5. 
The He and H produced in the various reactions 
generates swelling. The amount of swelling depends 
on the temperature at which the irradiation takes 
place, as is illustrated in Figure 6 from Wolfer and 
McCarville.1 Swelling of about 0.5% (5000 appm 
He) is typical at replacement in the ATR, although 
the specific time of replacement is determined by 
visual inspection for cracks and dimensional changes. 
Figure 4. ATR beryllium reflector block as machined.  
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Figure 5. Nuclear reactions resulting from neutron 
irradiation of beryllium. 
Since the ATR began operation in 1967, there 
have been four planned core internals change-outs 
(CICs), when the beryllium reflector blocks were 
replaced. These took place in 1977, 1986, 1994, and 
2004. The first CIC, in the early 1970s, was not 
planned but was necessary when the reflector blocks 
developed major cracks. As a consequence, blocks 
since then have deep stress relieving saw cuts 
perpendicular to the core axis. The OSCCs installed 
during original plant construction were reused for 
reflector II, and were changed out in 1977. After that, 
OSCCs were replaced with the reflector blocks. 
Including the original reflector, five beryllium 
reflectors (40 blocks) have been removed from the 
ATR. The sixth beryllium reflector was recently  
Figure 6. Irradiation induced swelling in beryllium. 
installed in the ATR. A seventh reflector is currently 
in process of being procured for a probable 2014 
CIC.
III DISPOSAL ISSUES 
These beryllium components have great advantages 
for operation, but their disposal has recently become 
a problem. Some reflector blocks and OSCCs from 
the first few ATR cores were disposed of at the 
INEEL Radioactive Waste Management Complex 
(RWMC) in earthen vaults. The blocks from the 1986 
CIC (core III) were kept in the canal until 1993 when 
six of the blocks were sent to the RWMC and placed 
in retrievable storage.2 At the present time, there 
remain in the canal 20 reflector blocks (8 from core 
V, 8 from core IV, and 4 from earlier cores) and 55 
OSCCs, pending removal to a more permanent 
storage facility. The reason disposal is difficult is the 
content of radioactive contaminants compared with 
acceptance limits for the disposal site. 
III.A. Uranium 
A major concern has been the presence of 
transuranics, produced from uranium impurity in 
irradiated beryllium. The presence of the uranium 
impurity in the beryllium metal was not identified nor 
incorporated into INL computer characterization 
modeling before 2002. Uranium had not been 
reported as present in previous beryllium reflector 
blocks. Uranium was not specifically limited in the 
ATR beryllium procurement specification nor was it 
indicated on the vendor supplied chemical assay data 
sheets that are routinely provided to the INL. The 
ATR procurement specification limits all metallic 
impurities in the beryllium to less than 400 weight 
parts per million (wppm).  
The presence of uranium in the new beryllium 
blocks procured for the ATR Core VI was 
determined from detailed chemical assay sheets from 
Brush-Wellman. Those concentrations ranged from 
23 wppm to 105 wppm with an average concentration 
of approximately 71 wppm. Calculations3 indicated 
that even at 30 wppm, the concentrations of alpha-
emitting radioactive isotopes with atomic numbers 
greater than 92 and half-lives greater than 20 years 
would exceed 100nCi/g in the ATR beryllium, which 
is the threshold for transuranic (TRU) waste. Some of 
these activation processes are shown in Figure 7.  
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Figure 7. Activation processes for uranium impurity 
in beryllium. 
No existing waste repositories could be found 
that would accept ATR’s transuranic waste 
beryllium. Even the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant 
(WIPP) in New Mexico, which accepts transuranic 
waste from defense programs, could not accept ATR 
beryllium, in part because of its large 3H inventory. 
III.B. Tritium 
An additional complicating factor for beryllium 
disposition is tritium (3H). The inventory of 3H in a 
beryllium reflector when it comes out of the reactor is 
about 2.2 MCi. Measurements of 3H were made at the 
INL (then Argonne National Laboratory-West) on 
samples taken from the reflector blocks in the ATR 
canal. Reported values range from 60–350 ?Ci/g.  
These samples were from low-flux positions at 
the outer edge of the reflector blocks, so 3H
concentrations should have been low. However, 
several measurements have been made on samples of 
beryllium irradiated in ATR to higher fluences. An 
early one was extraction by dissolution of a beryllium 
sample irradiated as part of the Phillips Atomic 
Energy Division Surveillance (PAEDS) program.4
These samples were of the same S-200E beryllium 
used for the first ATR reflectors and were cylinders 
1 cm in diameter and 3 cm long. Neutron fluence was 
5.5 x 1022 n/cm2 (E > 1 MeV). Expected 3H inventory 
at the time of the experimental measurement was 
32.6 Ci in the 4.7-g sample. 3H actually measured 
was 32.8 Ci (6.9 Ci/g) in the specimen. Of this, 32 Ci 
was found to be in the form of elemental gas, 
probably resident in gas bubbles in the beryllium. 
The remaining 0.8 Ci went into solution in the 
dissolving acid, indicating it was probably resident as 
a hydroxide, probably at oxide inclusions, or as a 
hydride in the beryllium lattice. 
Another measurement of 3H in PAEDS samples 
was in a demonstration of heat-only-extraction of 3H
from beryllium.5 Gamma spectrometry showed that 
each sample contained 1.2 mCi of 60Co, 33 ?Ci of 
137Cs, and a smaller quantity of 134Cs. Two samples 
were tested. Quantitative 3H release was not reported 
for the first, but it seemed to agree well with the 25-
30 Ci of 3H thought to be in the sample. The second 
was heated to melting and released 24.6 Ci of 3H (5.2 
Ci/g), in good agreement with expectations. It is 
interesting that none of the tritium escaped at 
temperatures below 650?C. Melting caused 87 
percent of the 137Cs to be released, but none of the 
60Co came out. One reason for the difference was 
probably the very high vapor pressure of Cs at that 
temperature. 
An additional thermal desorption measurement 
of 3H in a PAEDS sample was conducted at Pacific 
Northwest Laboratory where the tritium content was 
found to be 2,500 appm (8 Ci/g).6 There, too, tritium 
was not released until temperatures were in excess of 
600?C. 
While the 3H in irradiated beryllium is tightly 
bound in the beryllium lattice, it is released as the 
beryllium corrodes. Corrosion is common in ordinary 
radioactive waste soil depositories. The result is a 
plume of 3H observable in ground water and in the 
atmosphere over the burial site.2
III.C. Radioactive Carbon 
One further complication is 14C. Approximately 
19% of the total 14C in the INL Subsurface Disposal 
Area at the RWMC is associated with buried 
irradiated beryllium.7 That 19% constitutes about 
90% of the mobile 14C, which is a problem for 
containment of radionuclides in the disposal facility. 
The 14C is an activation product from 14N, which is 
virtually impossible to keep out of the beryllium 
because the powder from which it is formed is 
processed in air. The amount present is lower in some 
beryllium grades than others because of differences 
in processing procedures. Measurements of nitrogen 
and 14C inventories in samples taken from the 
reflector blocks presently stored in the canal, 
combined with detailed computer simulations of their 
operating history in the reactor, have demonstrated 
that the 14C levels in the reflector blocks are lower 
than the 80 Ci/m3 limit for Class-C designation when 
14N concentrations in the beryllium are less than 300 
appm. 
III.D Niobium 
94Nb is formed by neutron absorption in 93Nb
impurity. The concern for 94Nb arose because of 
previously unsuspected levels of 93Nb measured in 
the beryllium of the ATR reflector blocks. 
Measurements of 93Nb were in the range 1–23 wppm, 
up to two orders of magnitude greater than the 
previously accepted value of 0.2 wppm. 
It is believed that the reflector blocks will be 
greater than 10 CFR 61 Class C (GTCC) for disposal 
purposes because of high 14C and 94Nb levels. Even 
though they meet the Class-C requirement for 14C and 
94Nb specific activity individually, the total activity, 
from modeling based on measurements taken, is great 
enough (sum-of-fractions greater than 1) to make 
them GTCC. Though no measurements have yet been 
made on the OSCCs, available information suggests 
that some, if not most, of these will also be GTCC.  
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR BERYLLIUM 
DISPOSITION 
Early considerations addressed the possibility of 
removing the transuranics, the 3H, and possibly even 
the other beta-emitters from the irradiated beryllium. 
Several possibilities were considered. The process for 
getting the 3H out by thermal desorption is quite well 
understood.8 An INL research project explored 
removal of heavy metals using chemical dissolution.9
Alternative means of purification including gaseous 
chlorine reaction, distillation, and zone purification 
have also been suggested. 
An INL internal ATR beryllium disposition 
alternative study was conducted which strongly 
supports the following steps for beryllium 
management and disposal.  
• Continue storage of ATR beryllium in the ATR 
canal until a repository is available. 
• Classify the ATR beryllium as GTCC-like waste 
and include it in DOE’s complex-wide inventory 
of waste with similar characteristics, and co-
disposition with such waste. 
• Develop a current radiological inventory of 
beryllium waste presently stored in the ATR canal 
for comparison with potential storage and 
transportation container requirements. 
• Establish clearly defined requirements with 
respect to the National Environmental Protection 
Act (NEPA) and ensure ATR beryllium-specific 
NEPA-relevant issues are considered and 
appropriately addressed for past and future CICs. 
• Participate in and support development of national 
R&D strategies directed toward beryllium 
processing/recycling.
The only presently defined requirements for 
DOE waste to be included with the GTCC waste is 
that it has similar characteristics and would not 
otherwise have a path to disposal. The ATR 
beryllium meets these requirements. 
Efforts to develop processes for transuranic 
contaminant removal have been deferred pending 
further determination of disposal pathways. If it is 
found that the ultimate disposition pathway requires 
removal of the radioactive contaminants from 
irradiated beryllium, those efforts will be resumed. 
The available beryllium resource is sufficient to meet 
anticipated needs such that recovery of irradiated 
beryllium for the beryllium’s sake is unnecessary. 
Consideration was given several years ago to 3H
removal from irradiated beryllium for 3H resource 
recovery, but it was decided that the costs for such 
recovery were greater than the value of the 3H that 
would be recovered.  
V. FUTURE BERYLLIUM NEEDS 
The ATR is presently beginning procurement of 
the 7th reflector set. That beryllium will probably be 
installed in about 2014. Anticipating ATR operation 
to the year 2050, it is likely that two and possibly 
three additional reflectors beyond the 7th will be 
purchased. 
A concept for conducting fast flux testing in the 
ATR is presently being considered. It would require 
one lobe of the ATR to be operated at nominally 
twice its usual power level. That would mean the 
reflector blocks surrounding that lobe would require 
replacement at 5–year intervals rather than the typical 
10 years. It would create additional demand for ATR 
beryllium. It should be emphasized that this change 
in ATR operation is only at the conceptual stage with 
no determination to proceed. 
Regarding the composition of future beryllium 
purchases, one suggestion for reducing the 
production of irradiated beryllium waste with high 
TRU inventories is to remove the uranium from 
beryllium before it is fabricated into components and 
irradiated in the reactors. Brush Wellman has 
identified the possibility of supplying beryllium with 
uranium impurity levels in the vicinity of 1 appm. 
This material would be furnished at a necessary cost 
premium, but its other properties would be essentially 
the same as those of the normal S-200F grade.  
There are two major reasons the low-uranium 
beryllium was not considered as necessary for ATR. 
One is that the current material specification provides 
material adequate for ATR operation. Administrative 
processes are such that making any changes to the 
technical specification for ATR beryllium would be a 
very time-consuming and expensive process. While 
there is no technical reason to believe that the 
mechanical and neutronic properties of the beryllium 
would change, except for the lesser transuranic 
contaminant production, the very conservative 
operational requirements for the ATR mean that 
mechanical properties of the new material would 
have to be demonstrated, and doing so would incur 
substantial additional cost. The second major 
consideration is that there is on hand, awaiting 
disposal or now in the reactor, contaminated 
beryllium in a quantity approximately equivalent to 
that which would be procured with low uranium 
concentration. A process or pathway for dealing with 
this legacy material will need to be developed 
regardless of what is done regarding future 
procurements. Any such process or pathway would 
be capable of dealing with the material yet to be 
irradiated in the ATR. A further consideration was 
the difficulty in measuring uranium in beryllium at 
levels low enough to assure that the transuranic issue 
would be fully resolved given present levels of 
uncertainty in the predictive computer models. 
Verification would require the material to be 
produced, irradiated in the reactor, and then analyzed 
for transuranic content. That also would be expensive 
and time consuming. For these reasons, it was 
determined that it would not be in the ATR’s best 
interest to pursue development of beryllium with very 
low levels of uranium at this time. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
Like many research reactors, the ATR benefits 
greatly by having beryllium as its neutron reflector. 
Use of beryllium has a number of challenges as well 
as benefits. Because it must be replaced at regular 
intervals, there is a need for a disposal pathway for 
material that has been irradiated. Disposal of 
irradiated beryllium is complicated by activation 
products, which include 3H from the beryllium itself, 
beta-emitting isotopes from common impurities such 
as 14N and 93Nb, and alpha-emitting transuranic 
isotopes from uranium impurity.  
While there is no immediately available 
repository for that disposal, it has been determined 
that beryllium irradiated in the ATR can be 
designated as Greater-Than-Class-C waste, for which 
a path is expected in the not-too-distant future. 
Another interesting suggestion has been that by 
improving the quality of the beryllium, such as by 
reducing grain size, it may be possible to retard 
swelling of the beryllium for a given neutron dose 
and thus get longer life in the reactor. That is an 
interesting possibility that needs further exploration. 
The ATR will continue to make use of beryllium 
for the next several decades, but decisions regarding 
changing the specification of the beryllium to reduce 
impurities or provide longer lifetime in the reactor 
have not yet been settled upon.  
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